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98 N.C. L. REV. 165 (2019) 
“Be My Baby”: A Surrogacy Law Proposal for North Carolina* 
Surrogacy has become a popular alternative for couples who are unable to carry 
their own children. As artificial reproductive techniques advance, so too must 
the law. States have codified surrogacy arrangements in a variety of ways, 
including intent-based and best interests tests. However, North Carolina 
remains one of several states that has not provided any guidance, either by 
statute or case law, for its citizens considering a surrogacy arrangement. North 
Carolina can and should pass a surrogacy law because it would give peace of 
mind to intended parents to help ensure their surrogate children are legally their 
own. North Carolina family law provides a landscape conducive to develop 
surrogacy jurisprudence. The state already uses intent-based and best interests 
tests to determine the custody of children. Therefore, this Comment argues that 
North Carolina should develop a surrogacy statute to determine the legal 
parentage of a child based on its own pre-existing custody law, using both intent 
of the parents and best interests of the child as guides. By adopting a surrogacy 
statute, the state can provide much-needed reassurance to people considering 
surrogacy without disrupting the current family law framework. In doing so, 
North Carolina will update its laws to better reflect its citizens’ needs and bring 
it in line with modern reproductive practices. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“It was our biological child; my egg, Daniel’s sperm,” Ana Carla said. 
“Because the baby was going to come out of someone else’s vagina, unless 
we had a legal document saying that the baby was indeed our child and 
we wanted this baby and it was not going to be in any way associated 
with the surrogate, we had to go through this whole thing even though 
it seems like it could have been a much . . . simple[r] process.”1 
Ana Carla’s frustration foreshadows many of the issues North Carolina 
couples face to expand their families through surrogacy. This Comment seeks 
to ease Ana Carla’s and countless other North Carolinians’ uncertainties 
regarding surrogacy arrangements by proposing a solution for the North 
Carolina General Assembly to adopt. 
Surrogacy—most simply a woman carrying the child of another—dates 
back to at least Biblical times, when Genesis’s Abram and his wife Sarai used 
their Egyptian slave, Hagar, as a surrogate mother for their children.2 In the 
modern era, as fans of celebrity culture might recall, surrogacy is a popular 
option for many Hollywood mothers, from Sarah Jessica Parker to Tyra Banks 
to Kim Kardashian West.3 Surrogacy has surged in popularity in the last thirty 
years4 due to recent scientific advancements allowing a woman to carry a child 
who is not genetically hers, known as gestational surrogacy.5 Before scientists 
developed in vitro fertilization (“IVF”) in the late 1970s, all surrogate mothers 
gave birth to children who were genetically their own, commonly known as 
 
 1. Melissa Boughton, Modern Families Unprotected by Outdated NC Laws, N.C. POL’Y WATCH 
(Apr. 6, 2018), http://www.ncpolicywatch.com/2018/04/06/modern-families-unprotected-by-
outdated-nc-laws/ [https://perma.cc/JL7B-5ANE]. 
 2. Genesis 16:1–4 (New International Version) (“Now Sarai, Abram’s wife, had borne him no 
children. But she had an Egyptian slave named Hagar; so she said to Abram, ‘The Lord has kept me 
from having children. Go, sleep with my slave; perhaps I can build a family through her.’ Abram agreed 
to what Sarai said. So after Abram had been living in Canaan ten years, Sarai his wife took her Egyptian 
slave Hagar and gave her to her husband to be his wife. He slept with Hagar, and she conceived.”). 
 3. Corynne Cirilli, These 10 Celeb Moms Welcomed Babies Using a Surrogate, BRAVO (June 15, 
2017), http://www.bravotv.com/blogs/celeb-moms-welcomed-babies-using-a-surrogate [https:// 
perma.cc/TLF7-YB53]; see Joe Sutton, Kim Kardashian and Kayne West’s Surrogate Has Gone into Labor, 
CNN (May 9, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/09/entertainment/kim-kardashian-baby-
surrogate/index.html [https://perma.cc/22GE-W74V]. 
 4. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention reports that the number of artificial 
reproductive technology (“ART”) cycles using gestational carriers has increased 372% between 1999 
and 2013, from 727 cycles to 3432. ART and Gestational Carriers: Key Findings: Use of Gestational Carriers 
in the United States, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/art/key-
findings/gestational-carriers.html [https://perma.cc/X9WT-GJ4M] [hereinafter ART and Gestational 
Carriers]. 
 5. See Surrogate Has Baby Conceived in Laboratory, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1986, at A26 [hereinafter 
Surrogate Has Baby]. 
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genetic surrogacy.6 However, the advent of IVF allowed scientists to take 
genetic material from both the intended mother and intended father to implant 
an embryo in a surrogate who bore no genetic relation to the fetus.7 This 
advancement led to the first successful gestational surrogacy in 1986.8 
Improved technology resulted in increased legal headaches for surrogates 
and intended parents alike. With respect to genetic surrogacy, the surrogate 
carrier was also the biological mother, and courts could easily find that person 
to be the child’s legal mother.9 However, courts have reached widely varying 
conclusions when confronted with a surrogate who holds no biological 
relationship to the child she had carried, as is the case in gestational surrogacy.10 
Gestational surrogacy continues to prompt litigation today.11 
There are a few important preliminary points to address in dealing with 
surrogacy’s legal issues. First, it is important to note from the outset the 
differences between custody and parentage; even surrogacy commentators and 
judges sometimes confuse the terms.12 Custody involves a court’s determination 
of a child’s legal and/or physical status in relation to another person, including 
visitation rights.13 While physical custody and visitation rights are relatively 
self-evident, legal custody in North Carolina “refer[s] generally to the right and 
responsibility to make decisions with important and long-term implications for 
a child’s best interest and welfare.”14 Importantly, courts can, and regularly do, 
make custody decisions without determining the legal parentage of a child.15 
 
 6. See The History of Surrogacy: A Legal Timeline, WORLDWIDE SURROGACY SPECIALISTS, LLC 
(Aug. 8, 2018), https://info.worldwidesurrogacy.org/blog/the-history-of-surrogacy-a-legal-timeline 
[https://perma.cc/TE4T-R58T]; see also UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 801(1) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 
2017); Carla Spivack, The Law of Surrogate Motherhood in the United States, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 
(SUPPLEMENT) 97, 98 (2010) (“[Genetic surrogacy] involves the implantation of the surrogate with 
the sperm of the biological father, but uses the surrogate mother’s eggs to form the pregnancy.”). 
 7. See Surrogate Has Baby, supra note 5, at A26; see also ART and Gestational Carriers, supra note 
4. 
 8. See Surrogate Has Baby, supra note 5, at A26. 
 9. See Spivack, supra note 6, at 98 (“This earlier type of surrogacy, because it used the surrogate’s 
eggs, created [a] biological . . . connection which made it relatively easy for courts to determine that 
the birth mother was also the legal mother.”). 
 10. See id. at 99 (“This variant on surrogacy eliminated the birth mother/genetic mother equation, 
and led to litigation disputing the child’s parentage.”). 
 11. See, e.g., Cook v. Harding, 190 F. Supp. 3d 921 (C.D. Cal. 2016), aff’d, 879 F.3d 1035 (9th 
Cir. 2018). 
 12. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 n.10 (Cal. 1993) (“The dissent would decide 
parentage based on the best interests of the child. Such an approach raises the repugnant specter of 
governmental interference in matters implicating our most fundamental notions of privacy, and 
confuses concepts of parentage and custody.”). 
 13. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50A-102(3) (2017). 
 14. Diehl v. Diehl, 177 N.C. App. 642, 646, 630 S.E.2d 25, 27 (2006) (citing Patterson v. Taylor, 
140 N.C. App. 91, 96, 535 S.E.2d 374, 378 (2000)). 
 15. See, e.g., In re Safriet, 112 N.C. App. 747, 750–51, 436 S.E.2d 898, 900–01 (1993) (holding 
that the Department of Social Services should retain legal custody of a badly neglected child; the court 
was not called to determine—and indeed made no ruling on—the legal parents of the child). 
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Parentage refers to the “legal relationship between a child and a parent of a 
child.”16  
Parentage is, quite simply, who a minor child’s parents are, decided in 
North Carolina by genetic tests or, in the case of adoption,17 an affidavit of 
parentage.18 One judge noted the distinction between custody and parentage 
this way: “Logically, the determination of parentage must precede, and should 
not be dictated by, eventual custody decisions.”19 This difference is important 
because while any person or agency may gain custody of a child,20 earning the 
right to make decisions for the child, legal parentage belongs solely to the person 
or persons who are the child’s legal parents and can only be extinguished upon 
a showing of willful abandonment, neglect, or abuse of the child.21 In the 
hierarchy of care for a minor child, legal parentage is supreme. While this 
Comment proposes using North Carolina’s existing custody laws to craft a 
surrogacy statute, the ultimate determination is one of parentage of a surrogate 
child, not custody. 
Second, controversy centers on the enforceability of a surrogacy contract 
to determine the legal parentage of the child.22 The surrogate carrier and 
intended parents sign the surrogacy contract to ensure that the woman who 
carries the child for another person or couple will honor her commitment to 
relinquish the child at birth and that the intended parents will, in fact, take the 
child for whom they have contracted.23 However, there is no uniform surrogacy 
law in the United States, and various states have taken differing approaches to 
the surrogacy contract in the last thirty years.24 Some states, such as California, 
have embraced surrogacy contracts and provided legal protection for the 
continuance of the practice,25 while other states have banned it completely.26 
 
 16. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 102(16) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). 
 17. This Comment uses the term “adoption” solely to refer to the law, circumstances, and event 
of an adoption that is planned prior to the birth of a child. Though adoption can occur at any point in 
a child’s life, the comparison made here is solely to adoptions planned during a pregnancy. 
 18. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 8-50.1(a), 48-3-206(a)–(b) (2017). 
 19. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 n.10 (Cal. 1993). 
 20. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.2(a)–(b)(1) (2017). 
 21. See id. § 7B-1111(a) (Supp. 2018). 
 22. For more on how various states treat surrogacy agreements, see MAGDALENA GUGUCHEVA, 
COUNCIL FOR RESPONSIBLE GENETICS, SURROGACY IN AMERICA 14–16 (2010), 
http://www.councilforresponsiblegenetics.org/pagedocuments/kaevej0a1m.pdf [https://perma.cc/
2NWT-A9LR]. 
 23. See id. at 6. 
 24. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988), was the first major surrogacy case in the United 
States. Spivack, supra note 6, at 99. For a more a detailed discussion of the case, see infra notes 116–31 
and accompanying text.  
 25. See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 778. 
 26. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 122 (McKinney Supp. 2019) (“Surrogate parenting contracts are 
hereby declared contrary to the public policy of this state, and are void and unenforceable.”). 
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However, a great many states have not legislated at all on surrogacy or the 
validity of surrogacy agreements.27 
North Carolina falls into the final category because there are currently no 
statutes or case law on surrogacy in the state.28 As a result, North Carolina 
parents who wish to use surrogacy are left wondering whether or not a surrogate 
child will be legally recognized as their own. This uncertainty may lead 
potential parents to flock to surrogacy-friendly states, such as California, 
instead of taking their chances within the nonexistent legal framework in North 
Carolina; some potential parents may even decide not to pursue surrogacy at 
all.29 North Carolina has an opportunity to fix this problem using pre-existing 
family law statutes, specifically those involving custody arrangements. 
This Comment aims to provide the North Carolina legislature with a 
workable solution to adopt a law on surrogacy. In doing so, this piece adds to 
the scholarly discussion in two important ways. First, it takes the premise that 
existing North Carolina family law can be adapted to uphold, not strike down, 
the enforceability of surrogacy contracts. Indeed, other North Carolina scholars 
have argued for adapting existing North Carolina law to surrogacy 
arrangements.30 For example, in one of the few pieces of scholarship on North 
Carolina surrogacy, Katharine Bartlett argued that existing North Carolina 
adoption and custody law could easily govern the law of surrogacy in the state.31 
However, Bartlett concluded that existing North Carolina law would not 
uphold the enforceability of a surrogacy contract.32 Written thirty years after 
Bartlett’s piece and still before the codification of any surrogacy laws in the 
state, this Comment arrives at the opposite conclusion: the North Carolina 
legislature can effectively adapt existing child custody laws to surrogacy 
 
 27. For example, Alaska, Colorado, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, 
Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming have no laws regarding 
surrogacy. Surrogacy Laws, SURROGACY EXPERIENCE, https://www.thesurrogacyexperience.com/u-s-
surrogacy-law-by-state.html [https://perma.cc/H4AJ-XXA4]. 
 28. See Surrogacy in North Carolina, FERTILITY AUTHORITY, https://www.fertilityauthority.com/
articles/surrogacy-north-carolina [https://perma.cc/5JJ3-UV6V]; see also John L. Saxon, Who’s Your 
Daddy: Comparing North Carolina’s Paternity Law and the Uniform Parentage Act, UNC SCH. GOV’T: 
FAM. L. BULL., Mar. 2004, at 4, 18. 
 29. For more on the problems that plague intended parents using surrogacy in North Carolina, 
see Boughton, supra note 1.  
 30. Katharine T. Bartlett, Surrogate Parenthood: Finding a North Carolina Solution, 18 N.C. CENT. 
L.J. 1, 1 (1989). 
 31. Id. at 2. 
 32. Id. at 15–16 (“The policies underlying existing adoption and custody laws in this state seem 
inconsistent with an enforceability approach to surrogate parent contracts . . . . A surrogate parent 
contract should not be enforceable in North Carolina insofar as it ignores restrictions placed on 
adoptions in this state, including the statutory requirements for revocation of consent and the 
prohibition against payment of money in connection with an adoption.”). 
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arrangements in order to uphold surrogacy contracts and give intended parents 
more security to pursue surrogacy arrangements here in the state.  
Second, this Comment introduces a two-part test, based on intent of the 
parties and best interests of the child,33 that will help lawmakers craft a 
surrogacy statute for legal parentage. No other scholars have suggested or 
applied a two-part test within the context of North Carolina or its existing 
custody laws.34 Additionally, this Comment aims to correct a common yet 
concerning conflation of the legal consequences of custody with those of legal 
parentage via a proposal that concentrates solely on parentage. 
This Comment will proceed in five parts. Part I raises the question of why 
North Carolina needs a surrogacy law. Part II briefly addresses constitutional 
concerns regarding the enforceability of surrogacy contracts. Part III examines 
how other states have handled the validity of surrogacy contracts. Part IV 
examines existing child custody laws in North Carolina and suggests a similarity 
between other states’ surrogacy laws and North Carolina’s existing family law. 
Finally, Part V offers a test, based on other states’ surrogacy laws and North 
Carolina’s child custody laws, that enforces surrogacy contracts while also 
ensuring the best interests of the child. This test will eliminate the uncertainty 
that plagues North Carolina’s intended parents and bring the state up to speed 
on modern surrogacy practices.35 By mapping onto existing and well-established 
child custody laws and practices in the state, North Carolina can provide legal 
protection to both surrogate children and their intended parents without 
overhauling the state’s entire family law framework. 
 
 33. The best interests test only arises in cases where the custody or legal parentage of a child is in 
question. Therefore, in the case of natural conceptions between couples, the best interests test does not 
arise. This Comment considers the best interests test applicable because, while the motives behind 
couples who conceive naturally and those who must use a surrogate may be similar or identical, the 
mechanism by which each actually creates and acquires legal parentage of a child are different. The 
ethical considerations of questioning the motives of parents or hopeful parents in one circumstance but 
not the other are outside the scope of this paper. 
 34. For a multifactor test applied in California, see Matthew Demopoulos, Surrogacy in California: 
Replacing Section 7962 of the California Family Code with a Two-Part Hybrid Best Interests Test, 51 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1751, 1760–61 (2018). 
 35. For more on how North Carolina is currently “many, many steps behind the practice of 
humans,” see Boughton, supra note 1 (quoting a North Carolina attorney). 
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I.  WHY SHOULD NORTH CAROLINA PASS A SURROGACY STATUTE? 
To begin, it is important to note why North Carolina needs surrogacy laws 
at all. Currently, no statutes36 or case law37 directly address surrogacy in North 
Carolina, and only one statute deals with artificial reproductive technology at 
all.38 As such, North Carolina lacks governing law on surrogacy in the state. The 
absence of legal authority on the matter may lead some to question why North 
Carolina should pass a surrogacy law in the first place. There are several reasons 
to do so. 
First, there is some evidence that North Carolina’s courts would uphold a 
surrogacy statute. For example, some North Carolina courts have permitted 
“pre-birth parentage orders,” which indicate the intended parents—instead of 
the surrogate carrier—on the surrogate child’s birth certificate.39 However, 
surrogacy and pre-birth orders remain an “unsettled area of law” in the state.40 
Second, North Carolina needs a surrogacy statute because the current 
“unsettled” status of surrogacy in North Carolina may be pushing couples to 
other states to ensure their child is recognized as genetically and legally related 
to them. While empirical data on surrogacy in general is scarce41—and no 
estimate of the number of couples that travel out-of-state to obtain a surrogate 
carrier exists—there is some anecdotal evidence that couples are forced to do 
 
 36. In 2009, members of the North Carolina General Assembly introduced a bill to enforce the 
validity of gestational surrogacy agreements under certain conditions, including a court’s approval of 
the agreement before the surrogate carrier became pregnant. See S.B. 440, 2009 Gen. Assemb., 2009–
2010 Sess. (N.C. 2009); H.B. 510, 2009 Gen. Assemb., 2009–2010 Sess. (N.C. 2009). The bill, in fact, 
passed a first reading in the House and second reading in the Senate but was subsequently killed in 
committees of both houses. See also House Bill 510, N.C. GEN. ASSEMBLY, https://www.ncleg.gov/
BillLookUp/2009/h510 [https://perma.cc/6947-6AFS] (listing the legislative history of H.B. 510); 
Senate Bill 440, N.C. GEN. ASSEMBLY, https://www.ncleg.gov/BillLookUp/2009/S440 
[https://perma.cc/4C5R-BB2X] (listing the legislative history of S.B. 440) The legislative minutes for 
those committee meetings were unavailable at the North Carolina Legislative Library and North 
Carolina Archives at the time of this Comment’s completion. See House Bill 510, supra; Senate Bill 440, 
supra. 
 37. 5 Questions You Have About Surrogacy Laws in North Carolina, PARKER HERRING L. GROUP, 
PLLC, https://parkerherringlawgroup.com/surrogacy-lawyer-attorney-raleigh-nc/surrogacy-
information/surrogacy-laws-in-north-carolina/ [https://perma.cc/N6QJ-ZJ4K]. 
 38. Section 49A-1 of the North Carolina General Statutes states, “[a]ny child or children born as 
the result of heterologous artificial insemination shall be considered at law in all respects the same as a 
naturally conceived legitimate child of the husband and wife requesting and consenting in writing to 
the use of such technique.” N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49A-1 (2017). However, this statute is irrelevant to the 
surrogacy discussion because it does not contemplate a surrogate carrier who is artificially inseminated 
and gives birth to a child she does not intend to legally keep. 
 39. See What Is a Pre-Birth Order, and Why Is It Important?, PARKER HERRING L. GROUP, PLLC, 
https://parkerherringlawgroup.com/surrogacy-lawyer-attorney-raleigh-nc/establishing-parentage-pre-
birth-order/ [https://perma.cc/X5ZB-DPHX]; see also Gestational Surrogacy in North Carolina, 
CREATIVE FAM. CONNECTIONS LLC https://www.creativefamilyconnections.com/us-surrogacy-law-
map/north-carolina/ [https://perma.cc/K6TP-3ZPQ]. 
 40. See What Is a Pre-Birth Order, and Why Is It Important?, supra note 39. 
 41. For some relatively recent statistics, see ART and Gestational Carriers, supra note 4. 
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just that. For example, prominent family lawyer and professor Maxine Eichner 
recently discussed a North Carolina same-sex couple that was forced to travel 
to Utah, a state with liberal surrogacy laws,42 to ensure they could become the 
legal parents of their surrogate child.43 Similarly, a local North Carolina news 
station recently reported on a surrogate carrier living in North Carolina who 
carried three surrogate children using a California-based surrogacy agency, the 
Center for Surrogate Parenting.44 One of the many historic criticisms of 
surrogacy is that it commodifies women and babies, potentially turning a lower-
income woman’s body into a money-maker while richer women benefit.45 
Whether or not this criticism remains a valid concern today, by making 
surrogacy agreements uncertain at best, North Carolina lawmakers encourage 
the national trade of “baby-selling”46 for North Carolina couples desperate for 
a child.  
This is not to say, of course, that all states should be forced to enact the 
same legislation regarding surrogacy.47 Surrogacy is an issue fraught with debate 
and constitutional concerns,48 and states should be left to legislate—and indeed 
have legislated—as they see fit on the issue49 as “laboratories of democracy.”50 
However, by refusing to enact legislation on surrogacy at all, North Carolina is 
missing a valuable opportunity to regulate surrogacy arrangements in the state 
and help mitigate the number of couples forced to contract for a baby across 
state lines. 
 
 42. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-807 (Westlaw through 2019 First Special Sess.) (settling the 
parentage of a child born to surrogacy); see also id. § 78B-15-808 (upholding surrogacy agreements). 
 43. Interview with Maxine Eichner, Graham Kenan Distinguished Professor of Law, Univ. of 
N.C. Sch. of Law, in Chapel Hill, N.C. (Sept. 4, 2018). 
 44. ‘The Ultimate Gift’: Local Surrogate Mother Helps Fulfill Others’ Dreams, WRAL (Jan. 3, 2019), 
https://www.wral.com/the-ultimate-gift-local-surrogate-mother-helps-fulfill-others-
dreams/18099563/ [https://perma.cc/8BSJ-H3FZ]. 
 45. See Rebecca Beitsch, As Surrogacy Surges, New Parents Seek Legal Protections, PEW 
CHARITABLE TR. (June 29, 2017), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/
stateline/2017/06/29/as-surrogacy-surges-new-parents-seek-legal-protections [https://perma.cc/
FCV8-ETMG]. See generally Elizabeth S. Scott, Surrogacy and the Politics of Commodification, 72 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 109 (2009) (providing a historic account of why surrogacy was once viewed as 
“baby-selling” and how those views have since changed). 
 46. See Scott, supra note 45, at 109 (explaining some of the “baby-selling” drama that accompanied 
the In re Baby M case). 
 47. There are such issues within family law, such as jurisdiction for child custody, that have been 
uniformly adopted. See, e.g., UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION & ENFORCEMENT ACT § 201 
(UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1997).  
 48. See infra Part II.  
 49. See infra Part III.  
 50. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is 
one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens 
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of 
the country.”). 
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Lastly and most importantly, a well-established surrogacy law would 
eliminate, or at least drastically reduce, the insecurity that intended parents feel 
with regard to their child’s parentage. North Carolina currently uses genetic 
blood tests51 or affidavits52 in the case of adoption to determine a child’s 
parentage.53 These two methods of determining parentage pose problems for 
couples in which one of the intended parents is not genetically related to the 
child.54 Couples in that situation, most notably same-sex couples, are left with 
serious uncertainty about whether or not they will be the legal parents of the 
child they intend to bring into the world through the surrogate.55 Even 
opposite-sex couples who use a gestational surrogate, meaning both intended 
parents are fully genetically related to the child, are required to file a document 
certifying the child legally belongs to them.56 A well-defined surrogacy law that 
establishes legal parentage of a surrogate child would eliminate these obstacles 
and bring peace and security to intended parents. 
II.  A STATE LAW PROBLEM: THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS EXCEPTION AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES 
As a preliminary matter, the issues surrounding the enforceability of 
surrogacy contracts belong with state legislatures and in state courts. Since the 
late nineteenth century, federal courts have recognized a “domestic relations 
exception” to federal jurisdiction.57 The domestic relations exception dictates 
that “family law [is in] the exclusive domain of the states.”58 Originally, the 
exception applied to “[t]he whole subject of the domestic relations of husband 
and wife, parent and child,”59 although later cases limited the exception to 
“divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees.”60 Despite its somewhat unclear 
parameters,61 the domestic relations exception stands for the proposition that, 
except in “rare instances . . . in which it is necessary to answer a substantial 
federal question that transcends or exists apart from the family law issue, in 
general it is appropriate for the federal courts to leave delicate issues of domestic 
 
 51. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-50.1(a) (2017). 
 52. See id. § 48-3-206. 
 53. See Boughton, supra note 1 (“There are only two ways to be a parent in North Carolina - one 
can be an adoptive parent or one can be a genetic parent.”). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id.  
 57. See In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593–94 (1890); see also Meredith Johnson Harbach, Is the Family 
a Federal Question?, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 131, 131 (2009). 
 58. Harbach, supra note 57, at 131. 
 59. In re Burrus, 136 U.S. at 593–94. 
 60. Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992); see also Bradley G. Silverman, Federal 
Questions and the Domestic-Relations Exception, 125 YALE L.J. 1364, 1366–67 (2016) (providing an 
overview of relevant case law). 
 61. See Silverman, supra note 60, at 1366. 
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relations to the state courts.”62 Surrogacy thus likely qualifies as a “delicate issue 
of domestic relations” that state courts and legislatures are the most equipped 
to handle. 
Of course, the United States Supreme Court has seemingly disregarded 
its domestic relations exception in certain areas pertaining to family law. 
Therefore, any surrogacy solution proposed by the states must still fit into the 
parameters of constitutional jurisprudence. For example, while the Supreme 
Court has never decided a surrogacy case,63 it has recognized certain implicit 
fundamental rights, such as reproductive and child-rearing freedoms. The 
Supreme Court first found in Griswold v. Connecticut64 a constitutional right to 
privacy, a concept now firmly entrenched in constitutional jurisprudence as an 
implicit fundamental right.65 Intimately intertwined with the right to privacy is 
the right to procreate, central to such decisions as Eisenstadt v. Baird66 
(unmarried couples must have the same access to birth control as married 
couples)67 and Skinner v. Oklahoma68 (forced sterilization is unconstitutional 
because individuals have a right to reproduce).69 Then, in Roe v. Wade,70 the 
Court declared a fundamental right to terminate a pregnancy,71 later upheld in 
Planned Parenthood v. Casey.72 Likewise, parents have a fundamental right to rear 
their children as they see fit without undue interference from the state.73 
Parents also have the right to control who may visit their children.74  
In sum, as the Supreme Court in Prince v. Massachusetts75 held, “the 
custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary 
function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither 
supply nor hinder.”76 Thus, the Court, without deciding a surrogacy case, has 
 
 62. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 13 (2004) (citation omitted), abrogated 
by Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014). 
 63. See Arina O. Grossu, Opinion, Supreme Court Must Take on Heartbreaking Surrogacy Case, HILL 
(Sept. 30, 2017), https://thehill.com/opinion/judiciary/353252-supreme-court-must-take-on-
heartbreaking-surrogacy-case [https://perma.cc/EFS7-NHGV]. 
 64. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 65. Id. at 486. 
 66. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
 67. Id. at 454. 
 68. 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
 69. Id. at 541. 
 70. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 71. Id. at 164. 
 72. 505 U.S. 833, 901 (1992). 
 73. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400–01 (1923) (holding parents have a right to have 
their children educated in a language other than English); see also Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 
510, 519 (1925) (holding parents have a right to send their children to private school if they wish). 
 74. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 75 (2000). 
 75. 321 U.S. 158 (1944). 
 76. Id. at 166. 
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nevertheless provided the constitutional framework in which states must 
operate when crafting surrogacy laws. 
Without a direct answer from the Court, scholars and litigants alike have 
argued surrogacy agreements do not fit within the Court’s family law 
jurisprudence because they violate a surrogate’s constitutional freedoms. For 
example, some have argued that surrogacy agreements violate the surrogate’s 
implicit, fundamental privacy rights77 and the right to an abortion, should the 
surrogate seek one.78 Still others have argued that surrogacy agreements infringe 
upon a surrogate’s right to procreate and right to companionship with her 
child.79 
While these are valid constitutional concerns, there are also important 
counterarguments. For example, in the first major surrogacy case in the United 
States,80 the New Jersey Supreme Court found in In re Baby M81 that the 
“parent-child biological relationship, by itself, does not create a protected 
interest in the absence of a demonstrated commitment to the responsibilities of 
parenthood; a natural parent who does not come forward and seek a role in the 
child’s life has no constitutionally protected relationship.”82 Similarly, and 
perhaps most convincingly, a surrogate has the freedom to contract away any 
fundamental rights she chooses by “freely and knowingly entering into the 
contract” in the first place.83 
If and until the Supreme Court decides a case involving surrogacy, which 
is unlikely due to the domestic relations exception, states are left to grapple with 
the various constitutional boundaries the Supreme Court has set forward. Since 
the issue of surrogacy has been left to the states, states must be permitted to 
“serve as . . . laborator[ies]”84 to legislate on surrogacy arrangements 
accordingly.  
Surrogacy is a unique human condition, situated at the crossroads of 
contract law, concepts of bodily autonomy, and fundamental constitutional 
rights. This Comment’s proposal for North Carolina does not run afoul of the 
United States Constitution precisely because it allows for the surrogate to 
“freely and knowingly” agree to the terms of the surrogacy arrangement, leaves 
 
 77. See Spivack, supra note 6, at 107. 
 78. See Cook v. Harding, 190 F. Supp. 3d 921, 929 (C.D. Cal. 2016), aff’d, 879 F.3d 1035 (9th 
Cir. 2018). 
 79. In re G.P.B., Jr., 736 A.2d 1277, 1285 (N.J. 1999). 
 80. Spivack, supra note 6, at 99, 101. 
 81. 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988). 
 82. Id. at 1255 n.14 (citing Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 258–62 (1983)); see Quilloin v. 
Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 254–55 (1978). 
 83. Spivack, supra note 6, at 109–10. 
 84. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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some room for the surrogate to change her mind, and bolsters certainty in legal 
parentage.85 
States across the country have grappled with these constitutional 
arguments and legislated various surrogacy solutions as explored in the next 
part. 
III.  SURROGACY ACROSS THE COUNTRY 
A. California’s Intent-Based Test  
While many states, like North Carolina, have not yet broached the issue 
of surrogacy in lawmaking, other states have developed different approaches to 
the practice. One approach is the intent-based test, which centers on the validity 
of a surrogacy contract between the two parties: the intended parents who want 
the child and the surrogate carrier who carries the child.86 The idea is that if the 
intended parents and surrogate carrier do in fact intend for the surrogacy to 
occur and manifest this intent in a surrogacy contract, then the contract is valid 
and will be upheld.87  
California, perhaps the most surrogacy-friendly state in the country, 
chiefly utilizes this approach.88 In 1975, the state adopted the Uniform 
Parentage Act (“UPA”), which determines parentage by examining the 
relationship between parent and child once the child is born.89 The UPA takes 
an intent-based approach, stating that if the contracting parties meet various 
requirements, such as a minimum age and completion of a mental health 
consultation, the surrogacy contract is enforceable90 and the intent of the parties 
is dispositive.  
In 1993, in the landmark case of Johnson v. Calvert,91 the Supreme Court 
of California applied the UPA standard to a surrogacy arrangement in the 
state.92 In Johnson, a surrogate carrier bore a child with no genetic relationship 
to her but wanted to keep the child, while the intended biological parents argued 
 
 85. See Carmina D’Aversa, The Right of Abortion in Surrogate Motherhood Arrangements, 7 N. ILL. 
U. L. REV. 1, 15–16 (1987). 
 86. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993) (indicating the couples signed a 
surrogacy agreement and that the “case [could not be] decided without enquiring into the parties’ 
intentions as manifested in the surrogacy agreement”). 
 87. Id. 
 88. See Demopoulos, supra note 34, at 1761. 
 89. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 779. 
 90. For a comprehensive look at how North Carolina can update its family laws, including 
surrogacy agreements, in accordance with UPA, see UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 802(a)(1), (a)(4), 
(b)(1), (b)(3), 804 cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). See also Saxon, supra note 28, at 18–19. 
 91. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993). 
 92. Id. at 782. 
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the child was theirs.93 The court used the UPA’s parent-child relationship 
standard to apply an intent-based test94 and held that the child’s intended 
parents were the legal parents.95 The intended parents’ desire to have a child 
caused the pregnancy of the surrogate carrier.96  
California took its enforcement of intent-based parentage one step further 
in 2012 with section 7962, a statute which specifically validates and enforces 
surrogacy agreements between intended parents and surrogate carriers, 
provided that certain conditions are met.97 The “presumptively valid” surrogacy 
contract98 solidified California’s long-held position that only the intent of the 
parties to the contract should determine the legal parents of the child.99 Once 
the intended parents have executed a surrogacy contract that conforms to the 
requirements of section 7962, the surrogate carrier no longer has any legal right 
to the child she carried, and the intended parents are the legal parents of the 
child.100 
For many surrogacy arrangements, this process works smoothly because 
both parties receive what they contracted for: the surrogate carrier has the baby 
for the intended parents and may receive compensation, and the intended 
parents receive the baby they intend to parent. However, problems arise when 
the surrogate carrier refuses to give up the child she carried. One of the most 
recent examples of this situation came in the California case of Cook v. 
Harding.101 In Cook, a valid surrogacy contract existed between the surrogate 
carrier and plaintiff, Cook, and the intended, biological, single father, C.M.102 
The surrogate carried triplets for C.M., who was then a fifty-year-old, deaf man 
living with his parents on the opposite side of the country.103 Despite the valid 
surrogacy contract, Cook began having second thoughts about the arrangement 
a few months into her pregnancy when C.M. asked her to abort at least one of 
 
 93. Id. at 778. 
 94. Id. at 782. 
 95. Id. at 778.  
 96. Id. at 782 (“[S]he who intended to procreate the child—that is, she who intended to bring 
about the birth of a child that she intended to raise as her own—is the natural mother under California 
law.”). 
 97. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7962(a)(4), (b) (Westlaw through ch. 161 of 2019 Reg. Sess.) (requiring, 
for example, that both parties be represented by independent counsel and that the surrogacy contract 
contain information on how the intended parents will pay for the surrogate mother’s medical expenses). 
 98. Id. § 7962(i). 
 99. See Demopoulos, supra note 34, at 1760–61. 
 100. § 7962(f)(2) (“Subject to proof of compliance with this section, the judgment or order shall 
establish the parent-child relationship of the intended parent or intended parents identified in the 
surrogacy agreement and shall establish that the surrogate, her spouse, or partner is not a parent of, 
and has no parental rights or duties with respect to, the child or children.”). 
 101. 190 F. Supp. 3d 921 (C.D. Cal. 2016), aff’d, 879 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 102. Id. at 928. 
 103. Id. C.M. lived in Georgia with his two aging parents. Id. 
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the fetuses due to financial concerns regarding medical care.104 Cook refused 
and continued the pregnancy as planned.105 A few weeks before the children 
were born, C.M. seemingly had a change of heart and exercised his rights under 
section 7962 to terminate Cook’s parental rights and became sole legal parent 
of the three children.106 Concerned about the well-being of the children, Cook 
challenged section 7962 on constitutional due process and equal protection 
grounds.107 She posited that the family court’s decision to uphold the surrogacy 
contract violated the children’s due process rights to have a relationship with 
their mother and violated her due process rights to a hearing before the 
termination of her parental rights.108 However, the district court refused to rule 
on the merits, citing federalism concerns and the right of the state of California 
to deal with family law matters.109 As such, the family court’s decision to 
terminate Cook’s parental rights relating to the triplets stands,110 and section 
7962 currently remains good law in the state of California.111 
The Cook case illustrates the difficulties with using a solely intent-based 
test to determine the enforceability of surrogacy contracts.112 While intent tests 
and section 7962 certainly ease the burden on family courts, permitting the 
court to look no further than the four corners of the presumptively valid 
contract, can lead to situations where the best interests of the children are 
ignored.113 In Cook, while the intended father became hesitant about the contract 
and pushed to terminate the pregnancy, the surrogate carrier was a willing 
parent, offering to adopt one of the fetuses.114 Despite the surrogate carrier’s 
willingness to parent the children, parentage was awarded to the intended 
parent who, at one time, had tried to eliminate the fetus.115 This rigid conformity 
to the terms of the surrogacy contract, regardless of what might best benefit the 
children, has led some commentators to reject section 7962 in favor of 
multifactor tests that include the intent of the parents, best interests of the 
children, and other genetic and gestational factors.116  
 
 104. Id. at 928–29. 
 105. Id. at 929. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 929–31. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 936. 
 110. Id. at 930, 938. 
 111. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7962 (Westlaw through ch. 161 of 2019 Reg. Sess.). 
 112. See Demopoulos, supra note 34, at 1767–68. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Cook, 190 F. Supp. 3d at 929. 
 115. Id. 
 116. For more on this approach and an innovative point-based test, see Demopoulos, supra note 
34, at 1776–80. 
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B. New Jersey’s Best Interests Test  
On the opposite end of the spectrum from California’s rigid intent-based 
test lies the best interests test, first promulgated by the aforementioned and 
well-known case In re Baby M.117 In that case, as with many surrogacy disputes, 
the surrogate carrier refused to give up the child and a legal battle ensued.118 
The New Jersey Supreme Court eventually awarded custody of the child,119 who 
was genetically a product of the surrogate carrier and intended father, to the 
intended father but not on the basis of the surrogacy contract.120 Rather, the 
court found that surrogacy contracts, especially those in which the surrogate 
carrier is compensated for carrying the child, violate the state’s public policy 
and existing statutes.121 The court took special issue with the contractual 
termination of the surrogate carrier’s parental rights because a New Jersey 
statute already provided the legal pathway to terminate parental rights.122 
Instead of upholding the surrogacy contract and deciding the issue of 
parentage of Baby M, the court decided only the issue of custody on the basis 
of a best interests test, the standard required for custody disputes under New 
Jersey law.123 Under its best interests analysis, the court considered such factors 
as: the stability and financial situation of the home; the employment history of 
the parties; the potential presence of alcohol abuse by either party; and the 
“prospects for wholesome, independent psychological growth and 
development” of the baby.124 Had the case been decided under the intent-based 
framework of California, the intended father and his wife would certainly have 
been granted both custody and full legal parentage of the child because the 
parties had executed a valid surrogacy contract.125 While ultimately reaching the 
 
 117. 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988). 
 118. Id. at 1237. 
 119. Importantly, the New Jersey Supreme Court did not decide the issue of parentage, only 
custody. Id. at 1234. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 1234, 1240. 
 122. New Jersey requires a “written surrender to an approved agency or to [Division of Youth and 
Family Services]” or “a very strong showing of abandonment or neglect.” Id. at 1243. “[I]t is clear that 
a contractual agreement to abandon one’s parental rights, or not to contest a termination action, will 
not be enforced in our courts.” Id. The court continually reiterated this point throughout the opinion. 
Id. at 1245 (“Contractual surrender of parental rights is not provided for in our statutes as now 
written.”). 
 123. Id. at 1256 (“With the surrogacy contract disposed of, the legal framework becomes a dispute 
between two couples over the custody of a child produced by the artificial insemination of one couple’s 
wife by the other’s husband. Under the Parentage Act the claims of the natural father and the natural 
mother are entitled to equal weight, i.e., one is not preferred over the other solely because he or she is 
the father or the mother. The applicable rule given these circumstances is clear: the child’s best interests 
determine custody.” (citations omitted)). 
 124. Id. at 1258–59. 
 125. See CAL FAM. CODE § 7962(i) (Westlaw through ch. 161 of 2019 Reg. Sess.) (“An assisted 
reproduction agreement for gestational carriers executed in accordance with this section is 
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same custody (although not parentage) decision as California, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court in In re Baby M left the door open to a surrogate carrier gaining 
full custody of a child intended for other parents, should it be in the best 
interests of the child.126 States like Massachusetts have relied on existing family 
law doctrine to determine that surrogacy contracts—especially for 
compensation—are invalid, and courts must determine the best interests of the 
child.127 
One of the main issues with the divisive In re Baby M decision lies in the 
court’s reluctance to determine the legal parentage of the child, deciding the 
case only on custody grounds.128 The court relied on existing family law statutes 
in New Jersey to resolve a custody dispute between two genetic parents.129 
However, the court avoided the far more difficult question of who remained the 
legal parent of Baby M.130 Courts have long settled mere custody disputes, as 
opposed to disputes over parentage, by examining the best interests of the 
child.131 However, 
[t]he determination becomes more difficult . . . when a woman agrees 
before conception to bear a child for an infertile or same-sex couple and 
then changes her mind once the baby is born. Surrogacy cases raise 
additional concerns because it is not just custody, but parentage that is 
at issue.132 
C. A Hybrid Test: Contract Law and Best Interests 
In an apparent attempt to reconcile the intent-based and the best interests 
tests, some states have combined elements of both. For example, the Supreme 
Court of Wisconsin recently applied basic contract law to surrogacy agreements 
 
presumptively valid and shall not be rescinded or revoked without a court order.”); see also Cook v. 
Harding, 190 F. Supp. 3d 921, 937 (C.D. Cal. 2016), aff’d, 879 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 126. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1257 (“The issue here is which life would be better for Baby M, 
one with primary custody in the Whiteheads [the surrogate mother and her husband] or one with 
primary custody in the Sterns [the intended, biological father and his wife].” (emphasis omitted)). For 
more on best interests tests, see Demopoulos, supra note 34, at 1756–57. 
 127. See R.R. v. M.H., 689 N.E.2d 790, 796 (Mass. 1998) (“No private agreement concerning 
adoption or custody can be conclusive in any event because a judge, passing on custody of a child, must 
decide what is in the best interests of the child.”). 
 128. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1256–57. 
 129. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-40 (Westlaw through L.2019, c. 266 and J.R. No. 22); see also In 
re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1256. 
 130. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1256–57. 
 131. Austin Caster, Don’t Split the Baby: How the U.S. Could Avoid Uncertainty and Unnecessary 
Litigation and Promote Equality by Emulating the British Surrogacy Law Regime, 10 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 
477, 485 (2011). 
 132. Id.; see Rachel M. Kane, Cause of Action for Determination of Status as Legal or Natural Parents 
of Children Borne by Surrogate or Gestational Carrier, in 48 CAUSES OF ACTION 2D 687, § 20, Westlaw 
(database updated July 2019) (listing the states that employ a best interests test); see also Demopoulos, 
supra note 34, at 1756–57. 
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and upheld their validity, provided that the agreement did not violate the best 
interests of the child.133 Other states, such as Tennessee, uphold surrogacy 
agreements so long as they do not terminate the parental rights of the surrogate 
carrier—if she is also the genetic mother—before the child’s birth.134 However, 
these attempts to determine parentage of a child born to a surrogate mother 
tend to be ad hoc and often draw heavily from the state’s existing family law 
regime.135 
IV.  NORTH CAROLINA’S EXISTING FAMILY LAW STATUTES 
Despite some criticism that states dealing with surrogacy do so on an ad 
hoc basis by drawing from existing family law statutes,136 it makes sense to 
examine a state’s family laws—including those involving custody and 
adoption—to craft a surrogacy statute rather than start from scratch.137 This part 
first briefly touches on North Carolina’s adoption statutes.138 It then explores 
North Carolina’s custody laws and points out similarities between North 
Carolina’s existing laws and the intent-based and best interests tests explained 
above.  
A. North Carolina Adoption Statutes 
The current North Carolina law on adoption, codified at article 3 of 
chapter 48 of the North Carolina General Statutes, permits a mother to revoke 
her consent to adoption within seven days of giving that consent.139 Professor 
Katherine Bartlett, writing thirty years ago, argued that this law exists to protect 
the biological mother from exploitative circumstances surrounding the 
relinquishment of her child and that these same pressures exist in a surrogacy 
agreement.140 However, this argument is flawed, especially in the case of 
gestational surrogacy, in two ways. First, it presupposes that the woman 
carrying the child is the child’s legal mother in all cases. There is support for the 
proposition that, at least in certain circumstances, the carrier of the child is the 
 
 133. In re F.T.R., 833 N.W.2d 634, 648 (Wis. 2013). 
 134. See In re Baby, 447 S.W.3d 807, 833, 834 (Tenn. 2014). 
 135. See In re F.T.R., 833 N.W.2d at 644 (“Many courts have encountered issues surrounding 
surrogacy, and the cases often involve ad hoc procedures attempting to effectuate the parties’ intent by 
analyzing surrogacy issues under the state’s statutes for [termination of parental rights], adoption, 
custody and placement, and the like.”). 
 136. See id. 
 137. Other scholars have taken this approach to addressing surrogacy statutes, as well. See Bartlett, 
supra note 30, at 1–2. 
 138. See In re F.T.R., 833 N.W.2d at 644–45; see also Bartlett, supra note 30, at 3–4 (describing the 
proposition that adoption statutes lend themselves more easily to informing surrogacy statutes). 
 139. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 48-3-601(1), -608(a), (2017). 
 140. Bartlett, supra note 30, at 4–5 (“[I]t is questionable whether any woman can make a well-
considered decision about surrendering her child for adoption before the child is born.”). 
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child’s legal mother, regardless of the lack of genetic relationship.141 However, 
this broad presumption leaves little room for the genetic mother—whose desire 
for motherhood brought the child into the world and whose biological child the 
surrogate carries—to make any decisions regarding the child.  
Second, this argument also presumes that surrogate carriers are under the 
same exploitative pressures as a woman who has naturally conceived a child of 
her own and has determined she cannot care for it. Instead, unlike a mother 
who determines she cannot care for a child she naturally conceived, a gestational 
carrier becomes pregnant with the full knowledge that she carries the child for 
someone else.142 This difference between adoption and surrogacy alone is 
enough to differentiate between the public policy reasons for revocation of 
consent in adoption situations and the contractual nature of a surrogacy 
agreement.143 
Of course, there are similarities between planned adoptions of infants and 
surrogacy; namely, in both situations, a woman carries a child she will not raise 
as her own. These issues are complex, and courts should remain sensitive to any 
potential exploitation of either biological mothers giving their children up for 
adoption or surrogate carriers. However, this section simply argues that 
adoption and surrogacy are not interchangeable concepts, and based on the two 
above-mentioned faulty presumptions, it would be unwise to rely on North 
Carolina’s adoption statute in crafting a surrogacy statute.  
 
 141. See In re Adoption of A.F.C., 491 S.W.3d 316, 317 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2014) (holding that the 
“gestational carrier should be listed as the mother”); see also U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION 
SERVS., PA-2014-009, EFFECT OF ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY (ART) ON 
IMMIGRATION AND ACQUISITION OF CITIZENSHIP UNDER THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY 
ACT (INA) (2014), https://www.uscis.gov/policymanual/Updates/20141028-ART.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2Q2W-FRBT] (stating that “[a] gestational mother has a petitionable relationship 
without a genetic relationship to the child, as long as she is also the child’s legal parent at the time of 
birth” in the context of immigration). 
 142. This is not to suggest that a gestational carrier cannot develop maternal feelings for the child 
she is carrying. Most of the controversy surrounding surrogacy and surrogacy lawsuits centers on this 
very premise. As Bartlett points out, “That mothers will develop feelings of connection and 
commitment to their children during the course of pregnancy, notwithstanding agreements they may 
make to the contrary, demonstrates the strength of the parent-child relationship.” Bartlett, supra note 
30, at 5. However, this Comment argues that this “mother-child” pre-birth relationship, so present in 
adoption situations, is weakened in the gestational surrogacy context. 
 143. Other courts have come to this same conclusion. Indeed, the Johnson court, in examining the 
defendant’s argument that, based on California’s adoption statutes, the surrogacy contract should be 
voided, held “[g]estational surrogacy differs in crucial respects from adoption and so is not subject to 
the adoption statutes. . . . We are, accordingly, unpersuaded that the contract used in this case violates 
the public policies embodied in [the relevant California penal code] and the adoption statutes.” Johnson 
v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 784 (Cal. 1993); see Culliton v. Beth Israel Deaconess Med. Ctr., 756 N.E.2d 
1133, 1138 (Mass. 2001) (“As is evident from its provisions, the adoption statute was not intended to 
resolve parentage issues arising from gestational surrogacy agreements.”). 
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B. North Carolina Child Custody Statutes 
A more promising approach would be for the North Carolina General 
Assembly to adapt North Carolina’s child custody laws to the surrogacy 
arrangement. Like many states, North Carolina employs a best interests test 
when settling custody disputes.144 In determining the best interests of a child in 
custody situations, courts consider the following: the special needs of a child; 
the home, neighborhood, and school of the child; the religious instruction one 
parent intends to provide; the type of discipline; substance abuse; and domestic 
violence.145 However, North Carolina does not automatically resort to a best 
interests analysis in every custody dispute; rather, North Carolina courts only 
apply this standard after the court first determines that a natural parent has 
somehow not acted in the best interests of the child.146 
North Carolina courts have long held, under the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, parents have a right to oversee the “care, custody, 
and control of their children.”147 However, that constitutional protection is 
weakened when parents “act[] in a manner inconsistent with [this] 
constitutionally-protected status.”148 In those circumstances, courts will 
intervene to apply a “best interest[s] of the child test.”149 Importantly, the 
parent does not have to commit some “bad act[]” that might “endanger the 
children” in order to give up his or her constitutionally protected status.150 
Rather, the act could be something as simple as choosing to start a family with 
another person and “ced[ing] to [that person] a sufficiently significant amount 
of parental responsibility and decision-making authority to create a permanent 
parent-like relationship with his or her child.”151 In that case, the person to 
whom the parent ceded authority would have a strong claim to custody.152 
Further, the parent seeking custody must prove, by clear and convincing 
evidence, that the natural parent in fact acted in a manner inconsistent with 
being a parent.153 Importantly, when making this determination, North Carolina 
 
 144. See Price v. Howard, 346 N.C. 68, 79, 484 S.E.2d 528, 534 (1997); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§ 50-13.2(a) (2017). 
 145. See 1 LLOYD T. KELSO, NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY LAW PRACTICE § 13:11 (database 
updated Dec. 2017) (articulating factors in determining the best interest of a child). 
 146. Price, 346 N.C. at 79, 484 S.E.2d at 534; see also Estroff v. Chatterjee, 190 N.C. App. 61, 63–
64, 660 S.E.2d 73, 75 (2008). 
 147. Heatzig v. MacLean, 191 N.C. App. 451, 454, 664 S.E.2d 347, 350 (2008). 
 148. Id., 664 S.E.2d at 350 (citing Price, 346 N.C. 68, 484 S.E.2d 528). 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 455, 664 S.E.2d at 351. 
 151. Estroff, 190 N.C. App. at 70, 660 S.E.2d at 78. 
 152. See id. 
 153. David N. v. Jason N., 359 N.C. 303, 307, 608 S.E.2d 751, 753 (2005). 
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courts look to the intent behind the parent’s actions.154 Thus, the natural parent 
has to intend to give “parent-like status” to another person before they have 
ceded some of their constitutional protections as parent.155 In sum, North 
Carolina uses a two-part test to determine custody of children: the court looks 
first to see whether the natural parent intended to cede some of his or her 
constitutionally protected authority over his or her children; and, if so, the court 
will employ a best interests test to settle which parent should retain custody of 
the child.156 
North Carolina courts have used this test in a number of child custody 
cases. For example, in the Mason v. Dwinnell,157 the North Carolina Court of 
Appeals held that a natural mother had so intentionally involved her domestic 
partner in her children’s lives, including using the partner’s name as “parent” 
on school forms and declaring her a parent at the children’s baptisms, that she 
acted inconsistently with her constitutionally protected status as parent.158 As 
such, the court could apply a best interests test to determine who, between the 
natural mother and her domestic partner, should have custody of the children.159 
Notably, the court did not decide the issue of parentage in this case, indicating 
that the domestic partner did not achieve the status of a legal parent.160 Rather, 
the domestic partner simply had a right to custody of the child, under the best 
interests test.161 
In another case with very similar facts, the North Carolina Court of 
Appeals reached a different conclusion. Estroff v. Chatterjee162 also involved two 
domestic partners, with Ms. Chatterjee, the younger of the two women, 
deciding that she wished to bear children.163 Despite the women living as 
partners in the same home, Ms. Chatterjee intended to raise the children as her 
own and rejected the idea that Estroff was the “other mom.”164 The court held 
that Ms. Chatterjee decided to have children on her own and merely got 
 
 154. Estroff, 190 N.C. App. at 70, 660 S.E.2d at 78–79 (“By looking at both the legal parent’s 
conduct and his or her intentions, we ensure that the situation is not one in which the third party has 
assumed a parent-like status on his or her own without that being the goal of the legal parent.”). 
 155. Id. 
 156. See Price v. Howard, 346 N.C. 68, 79, 484 S.E.2d 528, 534 (1997); see also Heatzig v. 
MacLean, 191 N.C. App. 451, 454, 664 S.E.2d 347, 350 (2008); Estroff, 190 N.C. App. at 68, 660 S.E.2d 
at 77. 
 157. 190 N.C. App. 209, 660 S.E.2d 58 (2008). 
 158. Id. at 223, 660 S.E.2d at 67. 
 159. Id. at 223, 227–28, 660 S.E.2d at 67, 70. 
 160. Id. at 227–28, 660 S.E.2d at 70 (“[The natural mother’s] choice [to cede some of her parental 
authority] does not mean that [the domestic partner] is entitled to the rights of a legal parent, but only 
that a trial court may apply the ‘best interest of the child’ standard in considering [the domestic 
partner’s] request for custody, including visitation.”). 
 161. Id. 
 162. 190 N.C. App. 61, 660 S.E.2d 73 (2008). 
 163. Id. at 65, 660 S.E.2d at 75. 
 164. Id., 660 S.E.2d at 76. 
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permission from her partner to raise the children in the home in which they 
lived; Ms. Chatterjee alone picked the sperm donor; she did not permit hospital 
staff to call Ms. Estroff the “other mom”; and she emphasized that she alone 
was the children’s mother.165 These findings of fact led the court to determine 
that Ms. Chatterjee did not intend to relinquish her constitutional protection 
as parent of the twins, and therefore, a best interests test could not be applied 
for custody purposes.166 
The difference in outcomes between Mason and Chatterjee illustrates just 
how seriously North Carolina courts examine parental intent to determine 
whether a parent has ceded his or her constitutional protections. In Mason, the 
court found intent in the natural mother’s actions and therefore applied a best 
interests test, eventually awarding custody to both the natural mother and 
domestic partner in the best interests of the child.167 By contrast, the same court 
in Chatterjee could not find intent to cede in the actions of the natural mother 
and therefore did not proceed to a best interests test determination.168 
To summarize, in dealing with child custody cases, North Carolina courts 
primarily consider whether or not a natural parent has intended to give up some 
of his or her constitutional protection as parent. Once a court has determined 
that a parent has intended to act in a way that is inconsistent with his or her 
constitutional privileges, the court will look to the best interests of the child to 
decide the custody arrangement. 
V.  APPLYING NORTH CAROLINA’S CUSTODY LAWS TO SURROGACY 
North Carolina custody laws already contain the basic framework for a 
workable, practical parentage test for surrogacy situations. It is readily apparent, 
merely from the language of the custody cases above, that both intent and best 
interests play a large role in settling custody disputes in North Carolina. Intent 
of the parties and best interests of the child are also the main methods other 
states have used to give effect to surrogacy arrangements to determine 
parentage of a surrogate child. This section explores the possibility that North 
Carolina lawmakers can map onto the pre-existing custody laws to determine a 
child’s legal parentage.  
A. A Proposal for North Carolina Surrogacy Law 
I propose a two-prong test for legal parentage in North Carolina surrogacy 
cases. First, did the surrogate carrier agree to carry a child for the intended 
 
 165. Id. at 74, 660 S.E.2d at 81 (“Chatterjee did not choose to create a family unit with two parents, 
did not intend that Estroff would be a ‘de facto parent,’ and did not allow Estroff to function fully as a 
parent.” (citation omitted)). 
 166. Id. at 75, 660 S.E.2d at 82. 
 167. Mason v. Dwinnell, 190 N.C. App. 209, 230, 232, 660 S.E.2d 58, 71, 72 (2008). 
 168. Estroff, 190 N.C. App. at 75, 660 S.E.2d at 82. 
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parents, and did the intended parents agree to receive the child as their own, as 
evidenced by a valid surrogacy agreement? Second, would the surrogacy 
agreement be in the best interests of the child?  
Under the first prong, if a valid surrogacy agreement exists, there should 
be a strong presumption in favor of awarding parentage to the intended parents 
because the surrogate carrier has shown intent to cede to the intended parents 
any constitutional parenting rights she may have had, as in the North Carolina 
custody decisions. For the second prong, the burden should lie with the 
surrogate carrier to show that the arrangement would not be in the best interests 
of the child. This section will explain each prong in more detail. 
Under current custody laws, North Carolina first looks to the intent of the 
natural parent: Did that parent intend to give up some of his or her 
constitutionally protected parental privileges?169 The same test should be 
applied to determine parentage, as well: Did the surrogate carrier intend to give 
up some of her rights as a parent?170 If there is a valid surrogacy agreement, then 
North Carolina law should presume that the surrogate carrier did indeed intend 
to give up her rights to the child, just as the parent who ceded some of his 
authority as parent to a domestic partner in Mason gave up some of his custodial 
rights.171 
To determine the validity of the surrogacy agreement between the parties, 
and thus satisfy that the surrogate mother intended to relinquish any rights she 
held as parent, this Comment proposes using the UPA’s list of criteria.172 For 
example, section 802 of the UPA states: 
(a) To execute an agreement to act as a gestational or genetic surrogate, 
a woman must: (1) have attained 21 years of age; (2) previously have 
given birth to at least one child; (3) complete a medical evaluation related 
to the surrogacy arrangement by a licensed medical doctor; (4) complete 
a mental-health consultation by a licensed mental-health professional; 
and (5) have independent legal representation of her choice throughout 
 
 169. See supra text accompanying notes 121–30. 
 170. I adopt Kristen Bradley’s assumption that the surrogate mother does have some rights as the 
person who birthed the child for the purposes of this test. However, these rights are quickly settled as 
against the intended parent’s rights to the child using this test. For more on these constitutional 
implications of surrogacy, see Kristen Bradley, Assisted Reproductive Technology After Roe v. Wade: Does 
Surrogacy Create Insurmountable Constitutional Conflicts?, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 1871, 1901 (“It would be 
difficult to argue that a surrogate is suddenly devoid of all rights to her bodily integrity upon becoming 
a surrogate.”). See also Spivack, supra note 6, at 109 (expressing one constitutional argument that 
“because of her privacy right, the surrogate cannot waive the right to the child she carries, and that 
these rights trump the rights of the intended parents if the surrogate should change her mind at the 
birth of the child”). But see Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 785 (Cal. 1993) (holding that the 
constitutional rights of “substantive due process, privacy, and procreative freedom” do not apply to 
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 171. See supra text accompanying notes 157–61. 
 172. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 802–804 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017). 
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the surrogacy arrangement regarding the terms of the surrogacy 
agreement and the potential legal consequences of the agreement.  
(b) To execute a surrogacy agreement, each intended parent, whether or 
not genetically related to the child, must: (1) have attained 21 years of 
age; (2) complete a medical evaluation related to the surrogacy 
arrangement by a licensed medical doctor; (3) complete a mental-health 
consultation by a licensed mental health professional; and (4) have 
independent legal representation of the intended parent’s choice 
throughout the surrogacy arrangement regarding the terms of the 
surrogacy agreement and the potential legal consequences of the 
agreement.173 
Once North Carolina adopts these requirements, a court could easily 
discern whether a disputed surrogacy agreement is valid or not. If valid, the 
court would presumptively hold that the surrogate carrier intended to relinquish 
any constitutional rights she may have had with regard to the surrogate child. 
This intent prong represents the bulk of the test. Once a court has found 
a valid surrogacy arrangement in place, intent on the part of the surrogate 
carrier is presumed, and the court should lean strongly toward awarding 
parentage to the intended parents.174 As other proponents of an intent-based 
test have noted, relying on the contract between the parties gives intended 
parents a “bright-line test,” removing some of the uncertainty related to 
parentage of a surrogate child.175 In addition, North Carolina custody law is 
already well-settled in this area, so courts would simply have to apply the same 
test they always do in other areas of family law—what was the intent of the 
parent, or, in surrogacy cases, the surrogate carrier? 
However, using an intent-based test alone, even if based in existing North 
Carolina custody law, can lead to troubling results. Many argue that a surrogate 
carrier cannot contractually give away her constitutionally protected right to 
privacy, which is inherent in the surrogacy arrangement.176 Others have argued 
 
 173. Id. § 802. 
 174. This part of the test very much mirrors California’s section 7962(i), which reads: 
An assisted reproduction agreement for gestational carriers executed in accordance with this 
section is presumptively valid and shall not be rescinded or revoked without a court order. For 
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 175. See Teresa Abell, Gestational Surrogacy: Intent-Based Parenthood in Johnson v. Calvert, 45 
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that surrogacy contracts violate the constitutional rights of the surrogate 
children themselves, as the contracts tend to commodify children, and some 
states treat surrogate children differently than adopted children.177 Finally, as in 
the case of Cook v. Harding, an intent-based test may not lead to a scenario in 
the best interests of the child.178 Responding to these concerns, North Carolina 
should also introduce a second prong to the parentage test: a best interests 
standard. 
As with custody law, once a court examining a surrogacy contract finds 
intent, it should next turn to the best interests of the child. In this 
determination, the court should again award a strong presumption in favor of 
the intended parents. The California Supreme Court in Johnson v. Calvert 
iterated the main reason for doing so: “but for” the desire of the intended 
parents, the surrogate child would never have been born.179 Although California 
observes an intent-based test, the Johnson court reasoned that awarding 
parentage to the people who intended for the child to be born was also in the 
child’s best interests.180 This reasoning is both persuasive and logical because 
many of the factors that North Carolina courts examine when determining the 
best interests of the child, including the stability of the home and the financial 
resources of the parents, would seem to favor the intended parents whose very 
intent and desire brought the surrogate child into the world.181 North Carolina 
should likewise presume that awarding parentage to the intended parents would 
also be in the child’s best interests. 
Yet, this presumption should be rebuttable. There are some situations in 
which parentage might better remain with the surrogate carrier instead of the 
intended parents, as the case of Cook v. Harding arguably demonstrates.182 For 
example, circumstances might so change between the formation of the surrogacy 
contract and the time of the child’s birth that the best interests of the surrogate 
child change as well. In those cases, North Carolina would be wise to adopt a 
law that allows for flexibility. 
Consider, for example, how this test would apply to the facts of Cook. The 
California court hearing the case decided in favor of the intended father, despite 
valid misgivings on the part of the surrogate carrier, in order to uphold the 
surrogacy contract. Should a court apply this Comment’s proposed test to the 
 
 177. See Demopoulos, supra note 34, at 1765–66, 1770. 
 178. See supra text accompanying notes 112–16. 
 179. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993) (“But for [the intended parents’] acted-
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same set of facts, it is likely the court would award the surrogate carrier, not the 
intended father, parentage of the child. First, the court would find that the 
surrogate carrier intended to cede some of her constitutional authority to the 
intended father due to the validly executed surrogacy contract. Having found 
this, the court would move to the best interests prong of the test, with a strong 
presumption in favor of the intended father because he is the parent whose 
intent to raise a child brought the child into the world. However, examining the 
specific facts of this case—namely, that the intended father had at one time 
asked for an abortion of at least one of the fetuses, was in his fifties and deaf, 
and resided with his elderly parents183—the court would likely conclude the best 
interests of the children would be served with the surrogate carrier as their legal 
parent.184 
There are, of course, arguments against adopting a multipart test such as 
the one listed above. For example, those who favor the UPA may criticize this 
proposal185 because the UPA does not allow for a best interests analysis in the 
case of a valid surrogacy arrangement186 and instead severs all parentage rights 
of the surrogate carrier upon birth of the child.187 These opponents of a best 
interests analysis would argue that giving up the child upon birth is exactly what 
the surrogate carrier contracted to do, and she should be held to that contract. 
Indeed, for some it is a form of paternalism for the state to allow a woman to 
back out of a contract once she has entered it.188 Thirty years ago, much of 
Bartlett’s argument to permit a woman to revoke her agreement to serve as 
surrogate was based on the notion that “it is questionable whether any woman 
can make a well-considered decision about surrendering her child for adoption 
before the child is born.”189 Such a paternalistic theory would not and should 
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not hold much weight today, as it is premised on sexist notions of the frailty of 
female decisionmaking. 
By contrast, others might critique this test as placing too much emphasis on 
the surrogacy contract and not enough on the surrogate carrier’s unique legal 
position. Indeed, under my proposal, intended parents have a strong 
presumption of legal parenthood, absent some serious showing that the best 
interests of the child would be served by remaining with the surrogate carrier. 
However, I believe this proposal strikes the appropriate balance between the 
intent-based and best interests tests. To be sure, the proposal slants strongly in 
favor of the intended parents, so long as the surrogacy contract is valid. Yet, 
unlike the pure intent-based test, it leaves the door open for a surrogate carrier 
to express her genuine concerns about the well-being of the child she carried, in 
line with the concerns of Bartlett and other scholars. 
CONCLUSION 
Surrogacy across the United States is becoming a more popular alternative 
for couples who are unable to carry their own children. As artificial reproductive 
techniques advance, so too must the law. North Carolina remains one of the 
many states that has not provided any guidance, either by statute or case law, 
for its citizens considering a surrogacy arrangement. North Carolina can and 
should pass a surrogacy law because the state would receive it well, and it would 
give peace of mind to intended parents looking to ensure their surrogate 
children are legally theirs. North Carolina family law is already a landscape 
conducive to the types of tests that other states have used in order to determine 
parentage of a surrogate child: specifically the intent-based and best interests 
tests. North Carolina’s two-prong custody test, including a consideration of 
both intent and best interests, provides the basis of a statute by which to 
determine parentage in surrogacy cases. By adopting a surrogacy statute, the 
state can provide much-needed reassurance to people considering surrogacy 
without disrupting the current family law framework. In doing so, North 
Carolina will update its laws to better reflect its citizens’ needs and bring itself 
in line with modern reproductive practices. 
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